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CASENOTES
CONCLUSION
An implied warranty of habitability recognizes that if premises are to
be in a state of good repair, it is the landlord who must have the obligation
to repair them. The considerations outlined above indicate that such an ob-
ligation should apply to HUD as landlord in the same way that it in-
creasingly has been applied to private landlords. It is therefore submitted
that there is a need for a uniform federal rule regarding federally owned
housing and that the rule which best effectuates congressional policy is that
of an implied warranty of' habitability. The implication of a warranty of
habitability is not a guarantee that federal housing policy goals are being
met but rather is a rule which alters the common law duty to repair and
grants to tenants a contractual remedy where the premises are below
minimum standards of fitness. The Seventh Circuit in Alexander should not
have deferred a decision to Congress but instead should have decided the
issue presented on the merits and held that there is an implied warranty of
habitability in HUD housing. Since it seems inappropriate that tenants of
the federal government should be afforded fewer rights than those tenants
who have contracted in the private sector, the federal courts should adopt
as a uniform rule of federal common law an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity in urban residential leases where the United States is the lessor.
DAVID A. SLACTER
Federal Gift Taxation of Non-Interest-Bearing Loans: Crown v.
Commissioner'—Lester Crown and his two brothers were equal partners
in Areljay Company, an Illinois general partnership.' Prior to 1967,
twenty-four trusts benefiting children and other relatives of the Areljay
partners were established and funded in part by the partners. 3 During
1967, Areljay made various non-interest-bearing loans to the trusts so that
by December 31, the trusts owed Areljay a total of $18,030,024, all of
which were recorded in the books of Areljay and the respective debtor
trusts, and were payable on demand. 4 Throughout 1967, interest was
neither due nor paid on any of these loans. 5
In 1974, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) is-
sued a notice of deficiency, claiming that Crown owed $46,084.54 in addi-
tional gift tax for 1967. 8 The Commissioner alleged that the deficiency
67 T.C. 1060 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Sept. 2, 1977).
Id.
' Id. at 1061. In 1967, the Areljay partners had a total of 15 children, separate trusts
for 12 of whom were involved in Crown. Harry N. Wyatt was the sole trustee of all the trusts.
' Id. All were evidenced either by demand notes or by open account entries in Areljay's
records. No interest was charged on any of the open account loans. The demand notes simi-
larly required no payment of interest before demand, but did call for six percent interest after
demand. As of December 31, 1967, loans represented by demand notes totaled $2,073,649
and loans on open account totaled $15,956,375.
5 Id. at 1060. At all pertinent times, Areljay, its partners, and all of the trusts have op-
erated on the cash basis method of accounting. During 1967, the market prime rate of interest
ranged between live and one-half percent and six percent per annum, averaging 5.63 percent.•
Id.
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arose because Crown erroneously had failed to include the value of the use
of the moneys loaned to the trusts as gifts on his 1967 return.' The Com-
missioner took the position that not charging interest on the loans consti-
tuted a gift of the value of the use of the money loaned and that such use
value was subject to gift taxation under section 2501 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (Code).9
 Accordingly, the Commissioner computed
the value of the gift to be $1,086,407.75. 9
 Crown, as one-third owner of
Are!jay, was deemed by the Commissioner to have made a gift of one-third
of the amount so calculated, or $362,135.92." The additional gift tax due
if this sum had been included in Crown's 1967 return was $46,084.54, the
amount of the alleged deficiency." --
Crown brought suit in the Tax Court, asserting that the Commis-
sioner's attempt to tax these loans was beyond the legal authority granted
to the Commissioner under section 2501 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954." Accepting Crown's position, the Tax Court HELD: The making of
non-interest-bearing loans to family members is not a taxable event within
the scope of section 2501. 13
 In reaching its decision, the court actually did
not consider the legal sufficiency of the Commissioner's decision to tax
such loans. Rather, the court examined three factors which it determined
precluded acceptance of his position. First, the court noted that the Com-
missioner only recently has begun to assert that making non-interest-
bearing loans may give rise to gift tax liability." Second, the court pointed
to both the lack of case authority supporting the Commissioner's position
that such loans be taxed and the existence of case authority explicitly reject-
ing the Commissioner's contentions." Finally, the court observed that tax-
Id. at 1061.
8 1d. at 1061-62. Section 2501(a)(I) of the Code provides in part: "A tax, computed as
provided in section 2502, is hereby imposed for each calendar quarter on the transfer of
property by gift during such calendar quarter by any individual, resident or non-resident."
In 1973, the year before the notice of deficiency was sent to petitioner, the Commis-
sioner announced his position that:
The right to use property, in this case money, is itself an interest in property, the
transfer of which is a gift within the purview of section 2501 of the Code unless
full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth is received. The
tax ... would be imposed on the value of the right to use the money ....
Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
° 67 T.C. at 1061. The Commissioner determined that six percent per year was a rea-
sonable rate of interest, since this rate was only fractionally above the prime rate which pre-
vailed during 1967. In order to compute the amount of interest which would have been due
had interest been charged, the Commissioner applied this rate to the outstanding balance on a
daily basis. Id.
10 1d. at 1061-62.
" Id. at 1060.
' 1 1d. at 1062. The Tax Court's opinion included a strong dissent which, after noting
the congressional intent to have the gift tax broadly applied, the longstanding practice of dis-
counting fixed term notes to net present value, and the fact that giving use of property can
support a charitable gift deduction, concluded that the gift tax should apply in Crown.
Further, the dissent criticized the majority for applying erroneous and irrelevant precedents,
for failing to recognize the Commissioner's authority to change earlier interpretations of the






ing "permissive use" of assets between family members would be adminis-
tratively unmanageable." Weighing all these factors, the court concluded
that if the making of non-interest-bearing loans among family members is
to become a taxable event, further congressional action is required."
Although the Commissioner maintained that such loans clearly were subject
to gift tax under the Code, the court declined to decide this question on its
merits, preferring instead to leave unchanged what it deemed to be the
present law."
Crown v. Commissioner is significant because, if upheld on appeal, 19 it
could result in a serious diminution in the efficacy of the gift tax provisions
of the Code. Since a debtor is able to earn a return on a loan principal, a
person effectively could transfer large amounts of wealth to a debtor by
allowing a non-interest-bearing loan to remain outstanding over time.
Under Crown, neither the creditor nor the debtor would be subject to tax
from the transfer of the use of such loan funds. 2° Particularly in the area
of intrafamily loans, this result would enable parents to give their children
the equivalent of a beneficial life estate in a large sum of money without
incurring any gift tax liability. Furthermore, holding that such loans are
not subject to taxation frustrates the effectiveness of the gift tax in prevent-
ing income tax avoidance through income splitting schemes. Such income
splitting schemes could occur if the loan funds are invested at a profit.,
since the income earned would be taxable to the debtor rather than to the
creditor. 21 Thus, adherence to the Crown ruling would undermine the effi-
cacy of the gift tax provisions of the Code by presenting taxpayers with
10 1d, at 1065.
Id.
'" Id.
49 Crown is presently on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, and is scheduled for hearing in
the spring of 1978. See note I supra.
"For example, if in Crown the loans had remained open for 30 years and the burrow-
ing trusts earned six percent interest on the balance, over $70 million would have been trans-
ferred to the trusts. Even if' the trusts earned only four percent interest, nearly $35 million
would be transferred, The computations are: one dollar at four percent interest, compounded
annually, will equal $3.2433975 ( (1.04)") at the end of 30 years; at five percent the amount is
$4.3219424 ( (I.05)"); and at six percent the amount is $5.7434912 ( (1.06) ."). Thus, if $15
million is invested or lent at those rates of ret till 1, the total amounts owned at the end of 30
years would be, respectively, $48,650,962; $64,839,136; and $86,152,368. Subtracting the $15
million of principal, which must be repaid, yields, respectively, $33,650,962; $49,839,136;
$71,152,368. Even if some substantial diminution is assumed as a result of annual income
taxes (which may be entirely avoided through investment in tax-free municipal obligations) it
is apparent that very substantial sums have been effectively bestowed upon the debtor trusts.
" The primary motivating factor in income splitting schemes is the minimization of the
impact of the progressive rate structure. If an income producing asset is transferred from a
high income, high bracket taxpayer to a lower income, lower bracket taxpayer, the income
generated by the asset is taxed to the lower income taxpayer at his lower marginal rate. This
results in a net loss of revenue to the treasury. In Crown, the asset was the principal of the
loans. If these funds were used to procure income producing assets, say bonds or debentures,
the income would be taxed at the rate applicable to each trust. This would result in the in-
come being taxed at a lower rate, assuming, as is likely, the rate applicable to each trust was
lower than the rate applicable to Crown himself. The overall effect of such a scheme is a re-
duction in the total revenue paid to the treasury. Congress passed the gift tax to minimize
both estate tax avoidance through depletion of a taxpayer's estate by making inter-vivos trans-
fers and income tax avoidance through income splitting schemes predicated on the transfer of
income producing assets. By levying a tax on the transfer of' assets, Congress intended to dis-
courage transfers undertaken solely to avoid income taxes.
361
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several ways effectively to transfer large sums of money to family members
without the imposition of a gift tax.
This casenote will first analyze the Tax Court's opinion in Crown,
considering, in turn, each of the three factors relied upon by the court and
demonstrating how the court's reliance on these factors was unwarranted.
The casenote will then focus on the gift tax provisions of the Code and
will analyze the intended scope of application of these provisions. Finally, it
will consider the actual transactions involved in Crown and will indicate how
the intended scope of the gift tax should have led to the conclusion that
the transactions in Crown are subject to a gift tax.
1. THE Crown OPINION
In declining to permit the Commissioner to change his past practice,
and consequently declining to pass on the validity of the Commissioner's
claim that interest-free loans are subject to gift tax under the Code, the
Crown court relied upon three factors. First, and of primary importance to
the court, was the fact that the Commissioner only recently had attempted
to apply the gift tax to non-interest-bearing loans between family mem-
bers. 22
 The court decided that it was improper for the Commissioner to
change his earlier position of not taxing such loans without first obtaining a
specific mandate from Congress to accomplish the proposed change in
scope of the gift tax.23
As the second factor, the court surveyed what it deemed to be the
relevant case authority. 24 The court began its consideration of the cases by
discussing with approval Johnson v. United States.' There, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas refused to permit the ap-
plication of the gift tax in a fact situation virtually the same as that in
Crown. 2° The Johnson court determined that the gift tax should not apply to
any transfer that does not directly deplete the transferor's estate, since, the
court noted, the gift tax was enacted to complement the estate tax." Be-
cause the value of any outstanding loans is included in the transferor's
estate at death, the court reasoned that the making of a non-interest-
bearing loan does not diminish the transferor's estate and accordingly
should not be subject to the gift tax." Without independently analyzing
this issue, the court in Crown adopted the Johnson rationale, thus ruling that
on the facts of Crown the gift tax should not be imposed."
After stating that Johnson was the only reported case concerning the
applicability of the gift tax to non-interest-bearing loans, the Crown court
noted that other courts also have rejected uniformly the Commissioner's at-
tempts to subject such loans to liability under the income tax. 3° The court




• 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D, Tex. 1966).
22 Id. at 77.
" Id.
28 1d.
29 67 T.C. at 1064.
3° Id.
• 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
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sioner's attempt to tax the imputed interest on interest free loans from a
corporation to its shareholders and held that a shareholder's receiving of
over two million dollars in non-interest-bearing loans does not subject him
to income tax liability." The Dean court reasoned that, had the taxpayers
borrowed the funds on interest-bearing notes, their payment of interest
would have been fully deductible. Therefore, the court concluded, any in-
come that might be imputed as a result of receiving the loaned funds
would be cancelled by a like deduction under the interest expense deduc-
tion provisions in the Code." The Dean court decided that it was much
simpler to hold that receiving non-interest-bearing loans does not result in
income." The Crown court also cited two additional income tax cases in-
volving non-interest-bearing loans which, like Dean, refused to impose in-
come tax liability.35
After considering the past practices argument, and routinely applying
what the court deemed to be the relevant case law, the Crown court. con-
cluded that the administrative difficulties involved in applying the Commis-
sioner's approach weighed heavily against accepting his position." The
court noted that, if the Commissioner's approach were adopted, it could be
extended to a multitude of situations involving gratuitous use or sharing of
property among relatives. 37 This, the court reasoned, would lead to an ad-
ministratively unmanageable situation. 38
By aggregating these factors, the Tax Court reached the conclusion
that the established policy of not taxing non-interest-bearing loans should
not be altered at this time by judicial action. 3° Rather, the court indicated
that future congressional action would be required if such a change were to
take place.
It is submitted that the Tax Court failed to analyze properly all three
of the grounds upon which its decision was based. Consequently, the court
erred in concluding that non-interest-bearing loans should not be subject to
the gift tax. With respect to the first ground, in relying upon the fact that
the Commissioner's past practice had been not to tax such loans the court
failed to consider the broad authority possessed by the Commissioner to
change his earlier interpretations of the Code. 4° Indeed, the Supreme
32 Id. at 1090.
33 The Dean Court relied upon the applicability of § 163 as providing the requisite de-
duction. That section states, in part, that there "shall be allowed as a deduction all interest
paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." I.R.C. § 163.
34 Id. For a criticism of this general approach see, in this issue, Keller, The Tax Coate-
quences of Interest-Free Loans From Corporations to Shareholders and From Employers to Employees,
supra at —.
35 The two further cases considered by the Crown court were Saunders v. United States,
294 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Hawaii 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1974), and
Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974).





 This authority stems from I.R.C. § 7805, which provides in part:
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person other
than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary or his
delegate shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations as may be necessary by
reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.
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Court specifically affirmed this authority to change earlier interpretations
in Dixon v. United Stales." In Dixon, the taxpayers relied on the Commis-
sioner's published acquiescence in a Tax Court decision, 42 and, accordingly,
bought and later sold certain notes. 43 Subsequent to the sale of the notes,
the Commissioner reversed his position and announced his non-
acquiescence in the case relied on by the taxpayers." The result of the
Commissioner's new position was that the gain from the sale of the notes
did not qualify for preferential capital gains treatment, but rather was tax-
able as ordinary income." In upholding the Commissioner's change of po-
sition" and his application of' the new interpretation to the taxpayers, the
Supreme Court held that the Commissioner indeed does have the authority
not only to change his past interpretations of the Code but also to apply
those changes retroactively. 47 The Court further concluded that a tax-
payer's reliance on an earlier interpretation does not operate as a bar to the
Commissioner's ability to change his interpretation." Accordingly, under
Dixon, a prior erroneous interpretation or policy of the Commissioner does
not gain the force of law but rather is a "mere nullity." 49 The Commis-
sioner is thus free to change such prior interpretations and policies, and
neither the taxpayer's reliance on the earlier interpretation nor the passage
of time need impair the Commissioner's ability to do so. 5°
Applying the Dixon principle to the situation in Crown, it is clear that
the Tax Court should not have considered the Commissioner's past prac-
tice, but rather should have evaluated the legal sufficiency of the Commis-
sioner's new position. Dixon should control the situation presented in Crown
because it clearly upholds the Commissioner's authority to change past in-
terpretations of the Code, thereby permitting him to be responsive to
changes in the economic environment to which the Code applies. 5 '
In fact, the countervailing facts in Crown are not even as strong as
those found by the Dixon Court to be insufficient to deny the Commis-
... The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regula-
tion, relating to internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect.
I.R.C. § 7805 (subtitles omitted).
4 ' 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
42
 The case relied upon by the Dixon taxpayers was Caulkins v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.
656 (1943), affd, 144 F.2d 482 (1944). In Caulkins, the court held that gain received upon re-
tirement of an "Accumulated Investment Certificate" (which was essentially an annuity con-
tract) was entitled to capital gains treatment. 144 F.2d at 484.
43 381 U.S. at 69-70.
"Id. at 71,
45 Id. at 70.
46 Id, The Supreme Court previously had upheld the merits of the Commissioner's posi-
tion in United States v. Midland-Ross Corp,, 381 U.S. 54 (1965). There, the taxpayers had
bought non-interest-bearing notes at an original issue discount. Subsequently, the taxpayers
realized a gain on the sale of the notes before maturity. The Court held that this gain was or-
dinary income rather than capital gain. Id. at 67.
" 381 U.S. at 75. (Setting the standard of review of the Commissioner's action as abuse
of discretion).
48 Id. at 80.
' 4 ° Id. at 74.
5° Id. at 80.
" This desired flexibility is generally regarded as one reason for employing an adminis-
trative structure for applying a complex statute, and is consistent with accepted principles of
administrative law. See generally I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 34-44 (1958).
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sioner the right to correct past interpretations. First, the Commissioner's
position in Crown had been foreshadowed by his discounting of notes for a
fixed term to net present value in other tax situations, 52 thus indicating his
and the Code's recognition of the time value of money. Second, the Com-
missioner had never expressly announced his acquiescence in a case in-
consistent with his "new" position. 53 His alleged "prior interpretation" con-
sisted merely of failing to apply the Code aggressively to the transactions in
question. 54 In Dixon, on the other hand, the Commissioner's change in posi-
tion had not been foreshadowed and his prior inconsistent position had
been formally announced. It seems clear that if the Commissioner can
change retroactively an announced interpretation which has been relied
upon, he certainly can change his position with respect to an interpretation
which never had been formally announced, even where such interpretation
is inconsistent with his prior practice. While a court may determine that the
Commissioner's new position is in fact erroneous, it should not refuse to
permit him to revise his interpretation without determining that the pro-
posed interpretation is, in fact, in error. The authority to promulgate the
new interpretation cannot itself be judicially circumscribed.
The Tax Court's second ground, that of relying in prior cases, was
also flawed in that the court did not analyze critically the rationale underly-
ing the cases which it maintained supported the position that the making of
non-interest-bearing loans is not a taxable event. The first case discussed,
Johnson, was based on the premise that, in order to be subject to the gift
tax, a transfer must deplete the transferor's estate. 55 However, in view of
the legislative intent behind the gift tax, the imposition of this requirement
is unwarranted. The legislative history of the gift tax indicates that, in addi-
tion to preventing estate tax avoidance by depleting an estate through inter
vivos transfers, the gift tax also was intended to prevent income splitting
schemes designed to minimize the effect of the progressive income tax
rates." The Committee Reports relating to the gift tax state:
The gift tax will supplement both the estate tax and the in-
come tax. It will tend to reduce the incentive to make gifts in
order that distribution of future income from the donated
The Commissioner has generally required the valuation of notes for a fixed term to
be determined by computing the net, present value of the notes at prevailing interest rates.
This dearly indicates that the Commissioner's position is that the Code does indeed take cog-
nizance of the time value of the use of money. See Gertrude H. Blackburn, 20 MC, 204, 207
(1953) (Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's method of valuing a note on a net present
value basis in dealing with a bargain sale in a gift tax situation).
53 The Commissioner's failure to announce non-acquiescence in Johnson until 1973
should not be construed as his accepting its reasoning or result. The Commissioner need not
announce his acquiescence or non-acquiescence in district court cases. See S. SURREY, W. WAR.
REN, P. MCDANIEL & H. A tart', FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 66 (1972).
" The Cismmissioner took no action to apply the gift tax to non-interest-bearing loans
between the 1966 decision in Johnson, which was adverse to the Commissioner's position, and
his issuance of Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-I CB. 408 in 1973. The Commissioner did not an-
nounce non-acquiescence in Johnson until 1973. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
55
 254 F. Supp. at 77.
'" H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932), 1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 457, 462; S.
REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1932), 1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 496, 504.
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property may be to a number of persons, with the result that the
taxes imposed by the higher brackets of the income tax are
avoided."'
The Supreme Court, moreover, recognized this dual function of the gift
tax in Smith v. Shaughnessy," where the Court upheld the imposition of the
gift tax on the transfer of a future interest which, for estate tax purposes,
would be included in the transferor's estate and thus would be subject to
the estate tax upon his death. After noting that "[t]he gift tax was passed
not only to prevent estate tax avoidance, but also to prevent income tax
avoidance through reducing yearly income and thereby escaping the effect
of progressive surtax rates ... ,""" the Court concluded that the transfer
and income taxes were not mutually exclusive and that the imposition of
both taxes upon the same property was permissible."°
Johnson, then, is based on an assumption that has been expressly re-
pudiated by the Supreme Court, and which is contradicted by the legisla-
tive history of the gift tax. By narrowly focusing on only one purpose of
the gift tax, the Johnson court imposed as a prerequisite to the application
of that tax a requirement that is not expressed in any statutory provision or
other relevant authority. This requirement—that a transfer must deplete
the transferor's prospective estate before it is subject to the tax—seriously
undermines the efficacy of the gill tax in preventing income tax avoidance
through income splitting schemes. The transfers in Crown had precisely the
effect of splitting the income earned on the loan principal among the de-
btor trusts. Thus, the Crown court erred in applying the mistaken reasoning
in Johnson to Crown, since the gift tax was expressly designed to tax such in-
come splitting schemes.
Similarly, the Crown court's reliance on the cases refusing to impose
income tax liability based on the receipt of interest-free loans was in-
appropriate. The court apparently concluded that the income tax cases
were relevant to its consideration of the applicability of the gift tax to such
interest-free loans."' However, the fallacy of this conclusion is readily ap-
parent. The rationale in Dean, and the other income tax cases, was
grounded upon the existence of a corresponding interest expense deduc-
tion which would offset any income that might be imputed as a result of
receiving the loans." "There is, however, no such offsetting deduction in
the gift tax provisions of the Code. This absence of any applicable offset-
ting deduction renders the rationale used in the income tax cases in-
appropriate in the gift tax situation. Therefore, the Crown court's reliance
upon the income tax cases was misplaced, and the Crown court should not
have followed the reasoning in Dean and similar cases. Since the reasoning
in Johnson was incorrect and the analogy to the income tax cases was in-
appropriate, the Crown court was mistaken in deciding that there was clear
case authority for its position.
" H.R. RF.P. No. 708, 72 Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932), 1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 457, 476; S.
REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932), 1939.1 (part 2) C.B. 496, 524.
38 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
' 9 1d. at 179 n.l.
"Old. at 179.
81
 67 T.C. at 1064.
88
 I.R.C. 163. For text of 11 163, see note 33 supra.
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The Crown court's third ground, that of the administrative difficulties
involved in applying the Commissioner's position, is likewise unconvincing.
The court expressed concern that the tax would be extended to "a mul-
titude of situations involving the gratuitous use or sharing of real or per-
sonal property among relatives." 63 However, a large number of intrafamily
situations involving permissive use of property would not be subject to the
gift tax because of the annual exclusion of section 2503(b). 64 Under that
section, only when the rental value of property being used exceeds $3,000
does the gift tax apply. Thus, for example, in the case of a non-interest-
bearing loan, the section 2503(b) exclusion would preclude application of a
gift tax until the principal of the loan exceeds $50,000. 65 Another large
number of transactions likewise would not be subject to tax since the gift
tax is not applicable to transfers from parent to child if the transfers are
part of the parent's legal obligation to furnish support to the child." Taken
together, these two considerations would eliminate the administrative prob-
lems of taxing a substantial number of intrafamily transfers of the use of
property and would leave only the exceptional transfer, such as that in
Crown, subject to the tax. Furthermore, and more important, it is the
Commissioner, not the courts, who has the authority to make exceptions to
the statutorily mandated application of the tax." Even if' administrative
problems do result from applying the Commissioner's position, it is he, not
the courts, who must solve those problems by issuing regulations and pro-
cedures. It is not proper for a court to refuse to permit the Commissioner
to interpret the Code in an otherwise legally acceptable manner solely on
the basis that such interpretation may lead to administrative problems. The
Crown court thus not only overstated the problems involved in applying the
Commissioner's approach, but also misconceived its own role in administer-
ing the tax laws. Accordingly, the Crown court incorrectly gave undue
weight to the supposed difficulty in applying the new interpretation, and
63 67 T.C. at 1090.
" Section 2503(h) provides in part:
In computing taxable gifts ft)r the calendar quarter, in the case of gifts (other
than gifts of future interests in property) made to any person by the donor dur-
ing the calendar year 1971 and subsequent calendar years, $3,000 of such gifts to
such person less the aggregate of the amounts of such gifts to such person dur-
ing all preceding calendar quarters of the calendar year shall not, for purposes of
subsection (a), be included in the total amount of gifts made during such quarter.
I.R.C. § 2503 (b) (subsides omitted).
For gifts made after December 31, 1976, the annual exclusion has been supplemented by the
unified credit against gift tax. This should further enhance the effect of the annual exclusion
its eliminating many common family situations involving the use of property from taxation,
since the credit raises the minimum size of the gift required before any gift tax is due.
" Under § 2513, if a husband and wife jointly made the loan, no tax is due until the
loan . principal exceeds $100,000. This assumes that the Commissioner continues to apply six
percent interest to the loans. If he imposes a higher rate, naturally, the site of the loan qual-
ifying for the exemption would be reduced.
" Transfers made to satisfy a legal obligation, such as support or alimony, are consid-
ered made for full consideration, and thus are not taxable. See generally Estate of Fabrikant v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 714 (1963) (payments made in discharge of marital obligation); Mitch-
ell v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 159 (1940) (payments to settle support obligation to wife).
1" Section 7805 provides the authority to the Commissioner to make such administrative
exceptions to taxability, as in welfare payments. This, too, is consistent with general adminis-
trative law principles. See generally I K. DAvis, ADMIN[sTRATivE LAW TREATISE 75-158 (1958).
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failed to perform its proper role by declining to evaluate the legal suffi-
ciency of the Commissioner's position.
As a consequence of applying the "past practices" argument, un-
critically accepting erroneous and irrelevant precedents, and exaggerating
the administrative problems entailed in applying the Commissioner's posi-
tion, the Crown court never examined the economic substance of the trans-
actions involved and thus avoided consideration of the rationale underlying
the Commissioner's claim. The insufficiency of the Tax Court's reasons for
refusing to consider what the Code required in the Crown case leads to the
conclusion that the only proper role for the court would have been to eval-
uate the merits of the Commissioner's position. Since none of the Tax
Court's grounds withstands close scrutiny, it is submitted that the following
analysis should be adopted on appeal.
SUGGESTED ANALYSIS OF THE CROWNTRANSACT1ONS
A proper analysis of the Commissioner's position and the situation in
Grown would begin with an investigation of the intended scope of the gift
tax. After the limits to the applicability of the statute are ascertained, the
court should analyze the specific transactions involved in the case to de-
termine whether Congress intended to reach such transactions. This section
will first discuss the intended scope of the gift tax and then will consider, in
turn, the actual transactions involved in Crown and whether these transac-
tions fall within the intended scope of the gift tax.
A. Intended Scope of the Gift Tax
An analysis of the general provisions of the gift tax reveals a broadly
phrased statute which is to be applied liberally so as to include a wide
range of transactions. The statute defines in expansive terms the taxable
event which triggers the tax.
Specifically, section 2511(a), which defines the concept of transfer,
applies section 2501 "[w]hether the transfer is in trust or otherwise,
whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or
personal, tangible or intangible ...."" Section 2512(a) in turn provides
that "[w]here property is transferred for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the
value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be
deemed a gift ...."69
 This expansive statutory language, without expressed
limits, clearly suggests that Congress intended the tax to be broadly
applied.
Furthermore, the conclusion that Congress intended the gift tax to be
broadly applied is buttressed by the legislative history of its pro-visions. The
committee reports relating to these provisions declared:
The terms "property," "transfer," "gift," and "indirectly" are
used in the broadest and most comprehensive sense; the term
"property" reaching every species of right or interest protected by law
and having an exchangable value.
" 1.R.C. § 2511 (a).
" 1.R.C. § 2512(a).
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The words "transfer ... by gift" and "whether ... direct or
indirect" are designed to cover and comprehend all transactions
(subject to certain express conditions and limitations) whereby,
and to the extent ... that property or a property right is dona-
tively passed or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or
the device employed in its accomplishment."
Thus, the legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended
an extremely broad application of the statute.
The clear mandate of the legislative history and the broad statutory
language was recognized by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Wemyss. 7 '
There, the Court considered the intended scope of the tax, and, in adopt-
ing a broad construction and application of its provisions said:
[T]o reinforce the evident desire of Congress to hit all the pro-
tean arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are not
business transactions .... [O]n finding that a transfer in the cir-
cumstance of a particular case is not made in the ordinary course
of business, the transfer becomes subject to the gift tax to the ex-
tent that it is not made for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth."
Thus, the language of the statute, the legislative history and the un-
equivocal recognition by the Supreme Court of Congress' intenl lead in-
escapably to the conclusion that the gift tax was intended to attach to the
transfer of any benefit derived from property that is made without
adequate consideration. The unanimity of authority supporting an ex-
tremely broad application of the gift tax is complete.73
 Therefore, it is clear
that the form of the transaction or the type of property transferred should
not preclude application of the tax.
B. The Transactions in Crown
In order to determine whether the transactions in Crown conform to
the broadly stated requirements of the gift tax, it is necessary to determine
7° H.R. kr.r. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 28 (1932), 1939-I (part 2) C.B. 457, 476;
S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932), 1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 496, 524 (emphasis add-
ed).
7 ' 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
" Id. at 306-07. in Wemyss, the Court held that the gilt tax was applicable to a transfer of prop-
erty made pursuant io an antenuptial agreement, irrespective of the donee's promise to marry
since such promise did not have a monetary value. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the ex-
change was not for a full and adequate consideration.
78 1 n addition to the statutory language, the legislative history and the case law, the
treasury regulations also provide for broad application of the tax. Treas. keg. § 25.2511-1(c)
(1978) expansively provides that "all transactions whereby property or property rights or in-
(crests are gratuitously passed or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or device
employed, constitute gifts subject to tax ...." Further, Treas. keg. § 25.2512-8 (1978) pro-
vides:
[Ministers reached by the gift tax are not confined to those only which, being
without a valuable consideration, accord with the common law concept of gifts,
but embrace as well sales, exchanges, and other dispositions of property for a
consideration to the extent that the value of the property transferred by the
donor exceed the value in money's worth of consideration given therefor ....
369
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
first whether the transactions involve property which falls within the ambit
of the gift tax provisions, and second whether such property has been
transferred without full and adequate consideration. The first issue, then,
is whether the permissive use of money is a sufficient property right to be
itself classified as property for gift tax purposes. 74
Courts have recognized, in a variety of circumstances, that the use of
property has a value which the Code can reach. First, courts often have
found that donating the use of property can qualify for the income tax de-
duction allowed for charitable gifts under section 170. 75 Of special interest
in regard to the concept of use of property as a charitable gift is the
Seventh Circuit's decision of Mason v. United States," since, in that case, the
property being used by the charity was money, and since the appeal from
Crown will be decided by the same court that decided Mason. In Mason, a
taxpayer sold an asset to a charity for a total price equal to its fair market
value." The taxpayer, however, received in payment only a small amount
in cash and a long-term note for the balance of the purchase price. 7 " The
note called for interest substantially below the "going" rate.'" As a result,
the sum of the cash received and the present value of the note was less
than the fair market value of the asset transferred. The Mason court. held
that the taxpayer had made a deductible charitable contribution equal to
the difference between the prevailing conventional cost of financing the
purchase and the interest actually charged." Accordingly, the court
allowed the taxpayer a deduction based upon his giving the charity the use
of his money for less than the going rate."' Essentially then, the court rec-
ognized that donating the use of money was sufficient to support a charitable
gift deduction.
In addition to recognizing the value of the use of property in the
charitable gift context, it is well established that receiving the use of prop-
erty can result in income tax liability to the recipient based upon the value
of the use received. For example, in Chandler v. Commissioner," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the imposition of the
income tax on the value of the use of a home used by the taxpayer, where
" The Commissioner in Crown conceded that the loans were bona fide loans with a rea-
sonable expectation of repayment. No issue, therefore, was raised as to the application of the
gift tax to the loan principal. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
75
 This result was changed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The new law requires a
donor to relinquish all his rights in a property to qualify fur the charitable gift deduction.
However, this denial of a deduction is not based upon the premise that the use value is not
property, but rather upon the policy decision that the gift of the use of property should not
result in a deduction so long as the donor retains a beneficial interest in the property. See
I .R.C. § 170(0(3).
" 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 26.
" Id. The taxpayer sold an asset worth $117,000. He received $4,507.50 in cash and a
note for $112,689.42 payable over 20 years.
" Id. The note called for four percent interest per annum while the prime rate was ap-
proximately six percent.
"" Id. The present value of the note was $81,000. The sum of the cash received and the pres-
ent value of the note was $85,507.50. The difference between this and the value of the asset
was $31,492.50.
"' Id. at 29.
" 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941).
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the home was owned by a corporation for whom the taxpayer had per-
formed valuable services." The Chandler court thus recognized that the use
of property, when it is received in exchange for services, may result in in-
come and income tax liability to the recipient.
Since the use of property has been treated as itself a form of property
right for purposes of charitable deductions and For calculation of income, it
follows that the use of property could constitute "property" within the
meaning of the gift tax. Given the broad scope of the gift tax statute and
the judicial readiness to treat the value of the use of property as property
itself, it seems that applying the gift tax to the use value of property is in-
deed correct." Thus, the use of money in Crown should be held to consti-
tute property.
Since the value of the use of the money involved in Crown should con-
stitute property within the meaning of the gift tax, the next step in the
analysis is to determine whether there has been such a "transfer" of the
property as will trigger imposition of the tax. It is settled that the form of a
transfer does not affect. the applicability of the gift tax. The statute itself
declares that the tax applies "whether.the transfer is in trust or otherwise,
whether the gift is direct or indirect ... . " 85 The legislative history," trea-
sury regulations," and case law" all support the conclusion that the form
of the transfer is not relevant. Indeed, even a taxpayer's forbearance has
been held to be sufficient to constitute a "transfer" within the meaning of
the statute. In Estate of Grace Lang," the taxpayer had allowed the statute
of limitations to run on loans she had made to her son." The Commis-
sioner contended that her inaction, which had allowed the statute to run,
constituted a "transfer" of the principal of the loans, thus triggering the
imposition of the gift tax."' In upholding the Commissioner's imposition of
the tax, the Tax Court. held that even though the transfer of property was
accomplished without positive action on the part of the taxpayer, such
transfer was still subject to the tax. Accordingly, the fact that inaction ac-
complishes the transfer was irrelevant."
The same reasoning should be applied to Crown, because in Crown,
the transfer likewise was accomplished through inaction. Specifically, the
use of money was passed to the debtor trusts through the use of either
demand or open account loans. There was no irrevocable transfer of the
use of' the money, but rather it was through Areljay's forbearance in not
" 3 Id. at 626-27.
"'The allowance of a deduction for the donation of property is not limited to cases
where the use is granted for a fixed period of time. In Thriftimart, Inc., 59 T.C. 598 (1972),
for example, the Tax Coon upheld a charitable gift deduction FOr the gift of the use of office
space, even though the use was revocable at will on sixty days notice. Therefore, the fact that
in Crown the loans were repayable on demand should not preclude application of the tax.
1.R.C. § 2511(a).
" H.R. Rn. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 28 (1932), 1939.1 (part 2) G.B. 457, 476;
S. Rn'. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932), 1939.1 (part 2) C.B. 496, 524. -
"T Treas. Reg. § 25-251 I-1(c) (1978).
" See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wernyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
" 64 T.C. 404 (1975).
" hi. at 411.
"I Id. at 411 - 12.
"3 Id. at 413.
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demanding repayment that the use of the money was transferred to the
debtor trusts. Each day that repayment was not demanded resulted in the
transfer to the trusts of the value of the use of the money for that day.
Since, under the statute, any "transfer" is enough to trigger imposition of
the tax, the forbearance in Crown should constitute a sufficient "transfer" to
uphold the imposition of the gift tax.
It is thus clear that, for gift tax purposes, "property" was "trans-
ferred" in the Crown transactions. The only remaining issue, therefore, is
whether, under section 2512(b), the transferor received "an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth ..." for making the trans-
fers.93
 If not, under the terms of the statute, the gift tax applies to "the
amount by which the value of the property [transferred] exceeded the
value of the consideration."94
In Crown, the property transferred was the unrestricted use of the
loan funds. In return, Areljay received a legally enforceable promise to
have the principal of the loans repaid on demand. The promise to repay
the loans on demand constituted sufficient consideration to preclude the
application of the tax to the principal of the loans." The promise to repay,
however, does not constitute sufficient consideration to preclude completely
application of the gift tax to the loans. The promise to repay on demand
does not provide any consideration for the transfer of the use value of the
loans. Normally, interest charged provides the consideration for receiving
the use value of the loaned funds. However, Areljay received no considera-
tion for allowing the loans to remain outstanding, since there was no provi-
sion in the loans for the payment of any interest on the loans. Hence,
property was transferred without consideration. Since the transaction in-
volved was a transfer by forbearance, with no provision for interest, it
seems clear that no consideration passed in the transfer which the Commis-
sioner sought to tax. Therefore, the gift tax should apply to the use value
of the loan principal for the length of time the loans were allowed to re-
main open.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Court in Crown incorrectly determined that future congres-
sional action was required to establish that the making of non-interest-
bearing loans between family members is subject to the gift tax. The court's
reliance on the Commissioner's past practice, on erroneous and irrelevant
case law, and on the supposed administrative difficulties in applying the
Commissioner's new position was clearly misplaced. Rather, the court
should have examined the legal sufficiency of the Commissioner's position.
An examination of the intended scope of the gift tax and of the actual
transactions in Crown leads to the conclusion that the gift tax provisions re-
quire that the loans be taxable. The Crown opinion, then, should be over-
" I.R.C. § 25 I2(b).
" Id.
95 The Commissioner conceded the bona fide nature of the loans, thereby removing
from potential tax liability the principal of the loans. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
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ruled. Failure to do so would result in a serious diminution in the efficacy
of the gift tax, allowing taxpayers the possibility both to transfer large sums
without payment of tax and to avoid the effect of the progressive income
tax rates through income splitting schemes.
THOMAS F. qAILEY
Definition of a Branch Under the McFadden Act: St. Louis County Na-
tional Bank v. Mercantile Trust Company'---Mercantile Trust Company
(Mercantile) is a national banking association with its principal office lo-
cated in St. Louis, Missouri. 2
 In February of 1970, Mercantile, which is en-
gaged in the banking business and operates a trust department, opened a
trust office in Clayton, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louis. 3 Prior to opening
the Clayton office, Mercantile received notice from the Comptroller of the
Currency of the United States (the Comptroller) approving the establish-
ment of the trust office so long as Mercantile did not accept deposits, make
loans or pay checks at the location. Performing such activities would bring
the office within the definition of a branch set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 36(0. 4
Moreoever, the establishment of such a branch office is subject to the limi-
tations of 12 U.S.C. 36(c) 5 which permits national banks to establish
branches only if they are authorized for state banks by the law of the state
in which the national bank intends to open a branch." Since Mercantile in-
tended to open an office in Missouri and since Missouri law prohibits
branching,' if' the Comptroller considered Mercantile's office a branch, its
1 548 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977).
2 1d. at 717.
Id.
Id. Section 36(f) provides:
The term "branch" as used in this section shall be held to include any branch
bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of
business located in any State or Territory of the United States or in the District
of Columbia at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.
12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970).
I
 548 F.2d at 717. See note 6 infra.
" Section 36(c) provides in pertinent part:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city,
town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and op-
eration are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State
in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said association is
situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State
banks by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting
such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and
subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State
banks.
12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
7
 The relevant Missouri statute, Mo. REV. STAT. §362.105.1 (1) (1969) provides that "...
no bank or trust company shall maintain in this state a branch or trust company, or receive
deposits or pay checks except in its own banking house ...." In St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Pemberton, 494 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. App. 1973) a trust company sought, via a declaratory judg-
ment in state court, the authority to establish an office in Clayton to be used in connection
with its exclusive trust business in downtown St. Louis, The company argued that the ref-
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